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I
INTRODUCTION

The automobile bumper standard issued by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1982 was the product of a decade of policy
debate.' This debate continued in the courts until ultimately the NHTSA
bumper standard was upheld in 1985. Judge Antonin Scalia authored the
majority opinion in the case upholding the standard, and his opinion is the
subject of this paper.
The NHTSA bumper standard is by no means a landmark regulation with
sweeping economic consequences. The debate over the standard centers on
the degree of protectiveness to be required of front and rear automobile
bumpers. In particular, the issue is whether either or both bumpers should be
required to withstand a 2.5 mph crash or a 5.0 mph crash. The impact of
speed on bumper effectiveness, however, is a concern primarily with respect
to minor accidents. Bumper effectiveness is less of a concern in severe
crashes, where occupant safety is at stake. As a result, economic rather than
safety concerns dominate the debate over the bumper standard. The
fundamental question is whether stronger bumpers will save consumers
money.
The primary advantage of a 5.0 mph bumper is its ability to withstand
more severe impacts than a 2.5 mph bumper. Higher impact tolerance results
in lower repair costs and fewer automobile insurance claims for minor
accidents. This latter feature has made the insurance industry an avid
supporter of the stronger bumper, as minor accidents involve a high
proportion of administrative costs relative to the size of claims. To the extent
that state insurance regulations are based on the ratio of dollar losses to total
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premiums, reduction of minor accidents through the use of impact-tolerant
bumpers will boost overall profits in the insurance industry.
From the consumer's standpoint, however, the stronger bumper is not
necessarily superior to the 2.5 mph bumper. Indeed, stronger bumpers are
not intrinsically superior, or they would be required to withstand 55 mph
crashes. Some limit on bumper effectiveness is desirable, and the reason
becomes apparent upon consideration of the advantages of the 2.5 mph
bumper as compared with the 5.0 mph bumper. First, a 2.5 mph bumper is
cheaper to install and, if damaged, cheaper to replace. Second, more durable
bumpers weigh more (primary weight), and their use requires that additional
supporting weight (secondary weight) be added to the design of the car. The
addition of secondary weight requires that more metal be used in auto design,
hence reducing fuel efficiency.
The principal supporter of the weaker
standard has been Houdaille Industries, a manufacturer of 2.5 mph bumpers.
Although the stronger bumper has traditionally been supported by those
who view themselves as consumer protection advocates, whether the 5.0 mph
bumper is in fact more desirable for consumers is not readily apparent. An
analysis of the benefits and costs of the alternatives is needed to resolve the

issue. NHTSA was required by Congress to perform such an analysis, 2 and
much of the Scalia decision is concerned with the benefit-cost issue.
In assessing the Scalia decision, this article focuses on the following three
issues: First, what role does economics play in the framing of the legal issues?
For example, does the decision pose the regulatory choice in economic
efficiency terms? Second, what is the character of the legal arguments used?
Is sound economic reasoning employed? Third, does economics make a
difference in the outcome of the case?
Economic analysis plays a fundamental role in the NHTSA bumper
decision. Judge Scalia, exercising judicial discretion,3 poses the regulatory
choice in benefit-cost terms. The structure of the decision is almost entirely
that of a benefit-cost analysis, and the economic reasoning throughout is
sound. Although economics clearly plays an instrumental role, the decision in
effect upholds an existing economic analysis by a regulatory agency instead of
introducing an entirely new analysis.
It should be emphasized that the dominance of economics in this decision
is the exception rather than the rule. Even within the range of issues that
Judge Scalia has considered, this decision represents what may be regarded as
the most extreme example of the use of economics in his judicial
decisionmaking. As Judge Scalia has observed: "It is utterly unrealistic to
4
expect federal judges to engage in this sort of exercise on a regular basis."2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1912(b)(1) (1982).
3. See Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1338-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
4. Letter from Judge Antonin Scalia, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, to Professor W. Kip
Viscusi, University of Chicago (May 16, 1986). This letter was in general supportive of my analysis,
although Judge Scalia did wish to emphasize that this was an atypical decision.
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Perhaps economics has played such a small overall role in Judge Scalia's
caseload because his cases deal primarily with matters of administrative law,
where the main issue is whether a regulatory agency has undertaken proper
procedures, as opposed to whether the agency's actions maximize some
objective defined in economic terms. Nevertheless, the NHTSA bumper
decision is a classic example of the use of regulatory economics in the courts;
as such, the decision merits critical examination.
II
FRAMING THE REGULATORY ISSUE

The NHTSA bumper regulation is subject to two distinct sets of legislative
requirements. First, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act
(Cost Savings Act) stipulates that the bumper standard must meet a benefitcost test. 5 Second, this Act also requires that the standard not conflict with
any safety standard under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966 (Safety Act). 6 The Safety Act prohibits the promulgation of any
regulation that will lead to "unreasonable" risks of an accident. 7 Under both
of these acts, the court must uphold the regulatory decisions of NHTSA
unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." 8
The Scalia decision places greatest emphasis on the benefit-cost
considerations. In framing the issues in the introductory section of his
opinion, Scalia gives a lengthy discussion of the history of NHTSA's benefitcost studies and the nature of the tests that were performed. Scalia views the
likelihood of "arbitrary or capricious" behavior to be particularly unlikely with
respect to such benefit-cost analyses. Scalia urges that the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency, especially "when the agency is
called upon to weight the costs and benefits of alternative policies since
'[s]uch benefit-cost analyses epitomize the types of decisions that are most
appropriately entrusted to the expertise of an agency

....

'

Our role is to

determine 'whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment.'
In response
to the petitioners' assertion that the agency decision should be subject to
"more heightened and exacting scrutiny" because the regulation reverses an
earlier policy, Scalia notes that the Supreme Court has made clear that
differential standards do not apply to rescissions of a rule.' 0
Scalia thus selects the benefit-cost test as the dominant criterion for
assessing the agency's regulation and views such a test as the type of matter
for which agency decisions are less likely to be "arbitrary or capricious." The
"9

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

15 U.S.C. § 1912(b)(1) (1982).
Id.§ 1912(b)(2).
Id. § 1391(1).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.).
Id. at 1342-43.
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dominance of the benefit-cost test, however, hinges on the presumed
insignificant relationship of the bumper standard to safety.

As will be

discussed below, neither NHTSA nor Judge Scalia view safety as a significant
concern raised by the choice between the 2.5 mph and the 5.0 mph bumpers.
Judge Wright displays a quite different emphasis in his dissenting opinion.
He claims that the new regulation is "first of all, a change in a safety
standard.""II He later concludes that "any alteration of the bumper standard
to achieve cost reductions as mandated by the Cost Savings Act can take place
only after a determination that such alteration meets all of the criteria for an
alteration of the bumper standard as a motor vehicle safety standard under
the Safety Act. Any review under the Cost Savings Act, therefore, must give
precedence to the Safety Act review." 12 Although Wright does not assert that
the bumper standard has significant safety implications, he does conclude that
there is "manifest ambiguity ... on the question whether the agency ever considered
safety concerns under the Safety Act at all."' 1 3 In Wright's view, the issuance of the
regulation was therefore an arbitrary and capricious regulatory decision.
(The degree to which safety concerns were considered by the NHTSA will be
the focus of section III.)
In addition to disagreeing with Scalia's emphasis on benefit-cost analysis
rather than on safety, Judge Wright also challenges Scalia's claim that reliance
on a benefit-cost approach influences the court's role in reviewing the
regulation.
The mere fact that an agency is operating in a field of its expertise does not excuse us
from our customary review responsibilities. And, where the agency's reasoning,
although complex, is rational, clear, and complete, we must affirm. Contrarily, where
by the data it purports
the agency's reasoning is irrational, unclear, or not supported
14
to interpret, we must disapprove the agency's action.

Although reliance on a benefit-cost test certainly does not eliminate the

court's review function, Scalia never claims that this is the case. Indeed, his
majority opinion provides a comprehensive review of the components of
NHTSA's benefit-cost analysis. If Scalia had accepted the agency's views at
face value, his review of the NHTSA analysis-a review which is sometimes
critical-would have been unnecessary.
What is missing from the Scalia decision is a detailed analysis of the role a
benefit-cost test plays in decisionmaking. In effect, benefit-cost analysis is an
accounting system whereby an agency tallies the various categories of
beneficial and adverse effects of a policy and attempts to assign a dollar value
to these effects. Because this procedure is essentially a structure for
recognizing and comparing diverse policy impacts, it tends to promote more
"rational" and less "capricious" decisions.
Such analyses, however, are subject to two possible deficiencies. First, the
categories of benefits and costs may be incomplete. Second, categories of
11.
12.
13.
14.

Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1372 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1375.

Id. at 1373.
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benefits and costs may be reassessed. In the benefit-cost analysis of the
bumper standard, there is no indication that any benefit or cost component
has been omitted other than safety considerations. Although Judge Wright
views such considerations as potentially consequential, Judge Scalia and
NHTSA view safety considerations as insignificant. Furthermore, the
economic reasoning required in valuing the benefits and costs of the bumper
standard is fairly elementary. Assessment of the costs and benefits hinges on
technical parameters-the effectiveness of bumpers in reducing damage, the
amount of secondary weight generated by a heavier bumper, and similar
factors. With respect to these matters, Judge Scalia defers largely to the
agency's technical expertise. Hence, the potential deficiencies inherent in
benefit-cost analyses do not appear to be operative in the bumper standard
analysis.
Although there is no reason to believe that the most recent NHTSA
analysis was flawed in any way, it is critical to note that the performance of a
benefit-cost test does no more than provide a coherent structure for the
agency's analysis. Whether the components of that structure are sensible is
quite a different issue.
The greatest experience with benefit-cost analysis has occurred in the
water-resources field, where the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the Army
Corps of Engineers have been required for several decades to show that their
projects pass a benefit-cost test.' 5 The history of these projects has been one
of highly distorted benefit assessments and substantial underestimation of
project costs. Notwithstanding the application of a benefit-cost test, these
agencies' policies have become almost synonymous with political pork-barrel
programs.
The integrity of the NHTSA in this regard appears to be at a much higher
level. There are no glaring deficiencies in the analytical approach taken in the
1982 study, nor is there evidence that the agency manipulated its assumptions
over time to achieve an intended result. There is certainly no basis for Judge
Wright's rather sweeping claim that "NHTSA proceeded to perform a benefitcost analysis that appears, given the contortions that the agency went through
to reach its final conclusion, to have been solely a formalistic exercise aimed at
6
justifying a preordained result."'
Indeed, it is rather remarkable, given the several presidential
administrations between 1971 and 1982 and the changes in NHTSA's overall
policy recommendation, that Wright does not cite a single inconsistency in
the analyses prepared by NHTSA over that time. 17 In particular, in 1971
NHTSA required a 5.0 mph front bumper and 2.5 mph rear bumper. In 1976
NHTSA issued its first post-Cost Savings Act bumper standard after making
15. For a critique of the cost-benefit procedures of the Bureau of Reclamation, see R. BERKMAN
& W. Viscust, DAMMING THE WEST 7-9, 13-14, 34, 109, 191, 204 (1973).
16. Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1371 (Wright, J., dissenting).
17. The history discussed below is traced in Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1338-42
(Scalia, J.).
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three different proposals over the 1973-1976 period. In its first benefit-cost
analysis of the bumper standard undertaken in 1977, NHTSA found that the
2.5 mph standard was superior to the previously adopted 5.0 mph standard.
In early 1979, in response to a Senate request, NHTSA published a benefitcost analysis which supported the 2.5 mph standard. This analysis was revised
later in 1979 to show that the 5.0 mph standard was preferable. In April
1981, NHTSA speculated that a 5.0 mph rear bumper was not cost effective,
but that a 5.0 mph front bumper might be cost effective. In May 1982, the
agency concluded that a new 2.5 mph standard for front and rear bumpers
was desirable in each case. Surely, if a benefit-cost test can be manipulated to
achieve "a preordained result," then NHTSA economists were somewhat
remiss in not being sufficiently imaginative in doing so. As a result, Joan
Claybrook, while serving as Administrator of the NHTSA, was forced to make
a rather dubious appeal to congressional intent to have bumper protection at
8
the 5.0 mph level rather than at the economically desirable 2.5 mph level.'
Despite these various shifts in the agency's view, there is no evidence cited
in the decision or in the dissenting opinion suggesting that the assumptions
used were manipulated to produce a politically desired result. New
information regarding the underlying assumptions was provided on a
continuing basis by the affected parties.' 9 In some cases the evidence
pertained to accident data that became available only after the 5.0 mph
bumpers were mandated. In addition, circumstances changed after the earlier
analyses had been performed. For example, gasoline prices rose significantly.
Nevertheless, it is misleading to suggest that the NHTSA officials adhered
During the Carter
to the highest standards of economic analysis.
Administration, the Director of NHTSA espoused the 5.0 mph standard,
irrespective of whether the 2.5 mph standard was more cost-beneficial.
Political factors may also have been at work, as the bumper regulation was
included in the Reagan Administration's 1981 program of relief for the auto
industry.2 0 A similar regulatory reform option was also considered, but not
adopted, under the Carter Administration. The influence of political factors
does not in and of itself imply that the analyses were distorted or that the
decisions were incorrect. A crisis in the automobile industry, for example,
may have called political attention to the need for changes in policy.
It is not entirely coincidental, however, that NHTSA's position reversed
with the change in political administrations. Because of the slim margin of
superiority of the 5.0 mph standard in the 1979 NHTSA analysis, even modest
changes in the assumptions underlying the analysis could alter the result.
18. See id. at 1340.
19. A particularly active participant was Houdaille Industries, a West Virginia bumper
manufacturer. Studies of various aspects of the standard were prepared for the Houdaille lawyers by
Harvard economist David A. Wise. Professor Wise described these analyses to an attorney at
Covington & Burling. Letters from Professor David A. Wise to Richard Copaken (Jan. 7, 1980; Jan.
23, 1980; Jan. 24, 1980; and Jan. 25, 1980).
20. For a discussion of the Reagan Administration's efforts, see Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,
751 F.2d at 1368-69 (Scalia, J.).
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One such change was the rapid rise in gasoline prices during the 1979-1980
period. This and other factors omitted from the NHTSA analysis were called
to the attention of NHTSA in 1979 by the White House Council on Wage and
Price Stability (CWPS) and led to a reanalysis of the standard.2 ' Although
NHTSA placed greater emphasis on the set of assumptions that favored the
5.0 mph standard, the most plausible set of assumptions suggested to the

CWPS economists that "the net social benefits associated with the 2.5 mph
22
standard are greater than for the 5.0 mph standard."
In an attempt to urge the NHTSA staff to revise their analysis in the light
of this evidence regarding the implausibility of NHTSA's assumptions, the
CWPS economists met with NHTSA officials in February 1980. This CWPS
group was headed by the author, who at the time was the Deputy Director of
CWPS. Although the NHTSA economists did not dispute the claim that the
assumptions in the 1979 analysis regarding petroleum prices and secondary

weight should be revised in favor of the 2.5 mph standard, they were
unwilling to redo their analysis. The NHTSA economists suggested that
making every change that might be warranted could lead to an unpredictable
result. Their reluctance undoubtedly stemmed from the NHTSA
Administrator's enthusiasm for the 5.0 mph standard, which became apparent
when she exhibited a rather heated reaction to the CWPS accusation that the
23
1979 NHTSA analysis was "biased."
At the end of the Carter Administration, most of the CWPS economists
who had been involved in the NHTSA bumper standard were transferred to
the Office of Management and Budget. There, they assisted in the
preparation of the Reagan Administration's list of regulatory reform targets, a
list which included the bumper standard. In addition, NHTSA officials
updated the controversial assumptions underlying the 1979 analysis and, as
will be discussed below, this led to the superiority of the 2.5 mph standard in
the 1982 NHTSA analysis.
To say that one can rely on the judgment of NHTSA economists to
produce a sound and completely unbiased analysis is politically naive.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that NHTSA's behavior has been
"arbitrary and capricious." Except for the petroleum price assumption, all of
NHTSA's technical assumptions have been in the general range of
21. Letter from Michael M. Finkelstein, Associate Administrator Rulemaking, NHTSA, to
Thomas Hopkins, Council on Wage and Price Stability (Jan. 14, 1980) (letter on file with author). In
his letter, Finkelstein reviews the history of the interactions between the two agencies.
22. Letter from R. Robert Russell, Council on Wage and Price Stability, to Senator Robert Byrd
(Feb. 26, 1980). This letter was a brief summary of the Council's economic views and was not a

strongly worded advocacy piece against the bumper standard. It should be noted that Senator Byrd's
home state-West Virginia-is the site of Houdaille Industries, a principal opponent of the 5.0 mph
standard.
23. These concerns were expressed in a phone call by Joan Claybrook to Alfred E. Kahn,
Advisor to the President on Inflation (Mar. 1980). In that call, Claybrook objected to the integrity of
her staff being questioned. These concerns were also addressed in two letters. Letter from W. Kip
Viscusi, CWPS, to Joan Claybrook, NHTSA (Mar. 5, 1980); letter from Alfred E. Kahn, White House,
to Joan Claybrook, NHTSA (Mar. 27, 1980).
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plausibility. Some assumptions have been modified to favor the 2.5 mph
standard, but these modifications have not been so unfounded as to warrant a
conclusion that there has been a major manipulation of the numbers. Given
the uncertainties involved in such an analysis, some element of judgment is
inevitable. This judgment may undoubtedly be affected in part by the
politically desired result.
The NHTSA's failure to update the petroleum price assumptions until the
1982 analysis presents a greater departure from reasonableness. At the time
of the 1979 NHTSA analysis, however, the likelihood of a major gasoline
price increase was not as apparent as it became in subsequent months. In
addition, once an agency has completed its analysis and made a policy
decision, there is always some reluctance to redo that analysis. This
reluctance is especially great when the analysis supports the political
predisposition of the agency administrator.
These concerns do not imply that benefit-cost analysis is a useless sham
that can be manipulated at will. Rather, the benefit-cost test should be
regarded as a tool of advocacy not entirely different from noneconomic
arguments that can be mustered in support of a policy. Judge Scalia is correct
in arguing that an agency's benefit-cost judgments provide a sounder basis for
policy to the extent that benefit-cost analyses provide a comprehensive
approach to problems and, if properly utilized, lead to policies that are less
likely to be reversed by the courts. Although benefit-cost analyses are not
mechanisms that automatically calculate ideal policy without error, such
studies should be viewed as more reliable and convincing advocacy tools than
less structured political arguments for a policy.
III
SAFETY ACT CONSIDERATIONS

Irrespective of costs and benefits, it is clear that considerations under the
Safety Act must be met before a bumper standard can be issued.
Nevertheless, these safety considerations are not absolute. Auto safety
standards merely require elimination of those risks that are "unreasonable.'- 24
The closest parallel in terms of legislative language is the Consumer Product
Safety Act, which requires the Consumer Product Safety Commission to
remove all "unreasonable risks" from consumer products and to do so in a
manner that is "in the public interest." 2 5 There is also a parallel with the
mandate of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).26 As
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the benzene case, OSHA's mandate
is not absolute.2 7 Rather, as the Supreme Court has observed, OSHA has "an
obligation to find that a significant risk is present before it can characterize a
24.
25.
26.
27.

15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
AFL-CIO

§
§
§
v.

1391(1) (1982).
2058(d)(1) (1982).
651(b) (1982).
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614 (1980).
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place of employment as 'unsafe.' "28 NHTSA consequently need not be
concerned with the Safety Act provisions if the bumper standard does not
bear a significant relationship to safety.
Bumpers may potentially affect safety in several ways. The height at which
bumpers are placed and the material from which bumpers are made are two
variables through which bumpers may affect safety. Nonuniform bumper
heights, for example, may lead to greater tail-light damage, thereby increasing
the risk of accident. At the time of the Scalia decision, however, the
uniformity of bumper heights was already well established. Similarly, bumper
material and its effect on pedestrian safety was not a concern. The Scalia
decision consequently focuses more narrowly on two other mechanisms by
which bumpers affect safety-the protection of vehicle safety equipment and
29
crash energy management.
With respect to the protection of vehicle safety equipment, the Scalia
decision reviews the NHTSA studies on safety in some detail. NHTSA's
overall conclusion based on its studies was that "reduction of the 5/5 bumper
standard would not have any significant effect on safety." 3 0 This conclusion
was supported by NHTSA's review of the Ti-level Study of the Causes of Traffic
Accidents, 3 ' which concluded that under two percent of all accidents were
either probably or certainly caused by malfunctioning safety equipment in the
range of bumper system protection.3 2 Moreover, NHTSA concluded that
most of this malfunctioning was due to normal wear and tear. Upon
reviewing the NHTSA's safety studies, the Scalia decision proceeds to note
that it is the incremental safety differential between the 5.0 mph bumper and
the 2.5 mph bumper that is the fundamental matter of interest, and that this
incremental differential is likely to be even narrower than perhaps expected. 33
The differential must, for example, be substantially discounted to reflect only
that percentage of accidents involving failed safety systems which result in
deaths or injuries. Although this line of reasoning does not involve
economics per se, it does involve marginal analysis, which is at the heart of
what most economic analysis has to teach.
The NHTSA conclusion that the 5.0 mph bumper bears no significant
relationship to the protection of vehicle safety equipment was challenged by
State Farm Insurance, which cited accident data that indicated that damage to
safety items from model year 1974 cars (for which 5.0 mph bumpers were
required) was less than for 1973 cars (for which 2.5 mph bumpers were
required).3 4 Scalia's majority opinion notes, however, that because the 1973
28. Id. at 655. Note: there is no such OSHA provision. The court also observed: "But 'safe' is
not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' . . . [A] workplace can hardly be considered 'unsafe' unless it
threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm." Id. at 642.
29. Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1344-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.).
30. 47 Fed. Reg. 56,643 (1982).
31.

INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN PUBLIC SAFETY, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, TRI-LEVEL STUDY OF THE

(1979).
Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1344 (Scalia, J.).
Id.
Id. at 1346-47.

CAUSES OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

32.
33.
34.
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model year did not include a pendulum test for standardizing bumper heights,
the relationship is perhaps spurious.3 5 Moreover, Scalia's reworking of the
State Farm data for 1978, a year in which there was a standardized height but
a 2.5 mph bumper, shows no significant improvement in effectiveness for the
5.0 mph bumper as compared with the 2.5 mph bumper.3 6 This statistical
exercise serves to bolster the general conclusion that the bumper choice bears
no significant relationship to auto safety.
The second safety concern focused on in the Scalia decision is crash
energy management. With respect to crash energy management, the issue is
whether a 5.0 mph bumper helps to dissipate the impact of the energy caused
by a crash. Upon extrapolating the results of 30 mph barrier tests, NHTSA
concluded that there was little difference between the two bumpers' ability to
dissipate crash energy. 3 7 Moreover, Volkswagen suggested that a less durable
bumper might be more protective to the extent that firms have more freedom
to optimize the design of the entire crash management system. 38 Judge
Wright's rebuttal to these concerns consists of his claim that NHTSA did not
consider these safety matters with sufficient thoroughness. He argues, for
example, that the agency "produced no support for its statement that it had
considered crashes at lower speeds in its final rulemaking." 39 Judge Wright,
however, cannot point to any evidence indicating that, from an engineering
standpoint, the risk of injury to automobile occupants will be affected by the
5.0 mph bumper at crashes of any speed.
The task of the NHTSA was to prove that no significant difference exists
between the two bumpers' crash energy management capabilities. The extent
to which an agency should search to prove that no such difference exists is not
easy to ascertain. Unless the agency's efforts are exhaustive, it will always be
open to the criticism that a difference exists, but that the agency has not given
the issue sufficient attention to find it. However, because fully comprehensive
testing of all such relationships in which there are no readily observable
differences is financially prohibitive, the agency must use some judgment in
deciding how much to test. Unless testing will produce information that is
particularly inexpensive or that promises to alter beliefs substantially,
becoming fully informed will not be desirable.
The NHTSA faced a statistical decision problem in which acquiring
additional information was possible, but costly. The question thus becomes
whether NHTSA had any incentive to terminate this quest for information
prematurely. Given the Reagan Administration's program of relief for the
auto industry, it is possible that the NHTSA was reluctant to gather
information that would lead to a departure from the benefit-cost test.
However, in earlier administrations, particularly in those that supported a 5.0
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1347 n.7.
Id. at 1349.
Id.
Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1382 (Wright, J., dissenting).

Page 17: Autumn 1987]

REGULATORY ECONOMICS IN THE COURTS

mph standard, there was no effort to show that the 5.0 mph standard offered
significant safety benefits. The bumper standard has never been viewed as
having significant safety implications, and there is no reason to question
NHTSA's professional judgment on this issue.
IV
THE BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

The components of the agency's benefit-cost analysis, which is performed
in order to meet the provisions of the Cost Savings Act, are less controversial
than the safety issues. The decision divides these concerns into bumper
system costs and bumper system benefits, using the 5.0 mph bumper as the
reference point for both costs and benefits. Thus, the greater weight of the
5.0 mph bumper as compared with the 2.5 mph bumper represents a 5.0 mph
bumper system cost rather than a benefit of the lighter 2.5 mph bumper.
The principal bumper system costs are (1) the extra expense of the heavier
bumper plus the secondary weight it generates, and (2) the lower fuel
efficiency owing to the increase in primary and secondary weight. The critical
assumptions are largely technical in nature. NHTSA assumed that the 5.0
40
mph bumper generated an additional 15-33 pounds of primary weight,
where each pound of primary weight required the addition of 0.7-1.0 pounds
of secondary weight.4 ' This secondary weight assumption represents an
increase to a more plausible figure from NHTSA's earlier 0.5 pound
assumption. 4 2 Using updated gas price forecasts and, unlike the 1979
analysis, using OMB's required discount rate of ten percent, NHTSA
43
calculated the discounted cost savings associated with the lighter bumper.
The only legitimate controversy with respect to the cost calculations is that
the secondary weight reductions which would result from adopting a lighter
bumper would not be immediate, but would occur with a time lag because of
the nature of the design changes required. The Scalia decision, however,
views NHTSA's failure to account for this time lag in its cost calculation as
acceptable, since the relative costs and benefits of the two standards would be
unaffected if both the introduction of the 2.5 mph bumper and the weight
reduction were delayed by the same amount of time. 44 Because secondary
weight includes the supporting structures for a heavier bumper, Scalia views
the design change as an integral process whereby the bumper and supporting
structures would be altered simultaneously. If, however, a time lag occurs in
the reduction of secondary weight after the introduction of the 2.5 mph
bumper, as Judge Wright suggests, then NHTSA's failure to discount would
be incorrect.4 5 In both the majority and dissenting opinions, the economic
40.

Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1353 (Scalia, J.).

41.

Id. at 1354.

42.
43.

See supra note 21 (the analysis appended to the letter of Michael Finkeistein).
Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1351-53 (Scalia, J.).

44.
45.

Id. at 1354.
Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d at 1385 (Wright, J., dissenting).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. 4

methodology for discounting is applied correctly. The discrepancy between
the majority and dissenting opinions results from differing interpretations of
the underlying timing of the automotive design process.
The principal benefit of the 5.0 mph bumper is its greater effectiveness in
limiting damage in low-speed accidents. The pivotal assumption in NHTSA's
analysis was NHTSA's estimate of relative effectiveness for the bumpers. The
2.5 mph bumper was assumed to be sixty-three to sixty-seven percent as
effective as the 5.0 mph bumper. 46 These estimates, which were developed by
NHTSA from crash data, were challenged by insurance company petitioners
as being "guesswork." 4 7 Judge Scalia notes, however, that NHTSA viewed
these assumptions as reflecting the best engineering judgment of experts at
the agency: "We have no reason to disbelieve that statement, and
engineering judgment is assuredly the sort of expertise that NHTSA
preeminently possesses. "48
It is with respect to this effectiveness assumption that Scalia makes
particularly effective use of the consistency of the agency's analysis over time.
Not only were the NHTSA's effectiveness assumptions unchanged, but
NHTSA specifically asked the petitioners (and other rulemaking participants) in 1979:
"Do the existing analyses represent the most appropriate methods of approaching a
study of bumper standards at different impact speeds and levels of damage resistance?
If not, what method should be used?" .... Though State Farm and IIHS, among
that
others, responded with substantial comments.., there was not even a suggestion
49
the effectiveness curves represented a fundamentally invalid methodology.

Indeed, this line of argument could be used more generally to defend the
integrity of the NHTSA analysis. The manner in which NHTSA presented its
conclusions of the benefit-cost analysis is another object of controversy.
Because of the uncertainty regarding different assumptions, NHTSA
presented ranges of benefit and cost values rather than a single value. In
interpreting these ranges, the petitioners suggested that NHTSA should
simply average the results. 50 Judge Scalia makes the quite correct and
analytically sophisticated response that "averaging values from all four sets of
extreme assumptions would be statistically valid only if each of the four
combinations had an equal probability of occurrence. The agency explicitly
found, however, that it was 'virtually impossible' for the fourth combination
. . .to appear in the real world." ' 5 1 In this, as in the other sections of the
decision, Judge Scalia employs highly sophisticated economic reasoning.
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V
WHAT ROLE FOR THE MARKET

Perhaps the greatest element missing from both the rulemaking procedure
and the court's decision is a discussion of the role of market forces in
promoting the efficient provision of bumpers. What market failure prevents
consumers from receiving the correct bumper strength? It is conceivable, for
example, that because cars are bundled commodities with multiple attributes,
there is no assurance of an ideal market outcome. However, no such claims
have been made. In the absence of any such inadequacy in the market, the
failure of the market to provide 5.0 mph bumpers rather than 2.5 mph
bumpers is, in and of itself, evidence that the benefits of a 5.0 mph bumper
are lower than its costs.
The point here is not that the judiciary should routinely question the
desirability of regulations and overturn regulations for which no existing
market failure has been demonstrated. Rather, because the fundamental issue
is whether the stronger bumper passes a benefit-cost test, examining the
presence of a market failure is another way to address the benefit-cost issue.
If there exists no inadequacy in the stringency of bumpers that would be
observed in an unregulated market, then the costs of a more stringent bumper
exceed the benefits.
Although Scalia never displays the kind of unbridled enthusiasm for
market forces that one might expect from a former University of Chicago
professor, he does exhibit an understanding of these forces when discussing
one petitioner's motion on a limited remand.
Finally, and most important of all, NHTSA's benefit-cost analysis simply assumed that
all automobile manufacturers would adopt a 2.5 mph bumper system, whereas it
seems probable that some manufacturers will continue to produce and will advertise
more protective bumpers. The benefit-cost results of the circumstances are most
unlikely to be random, since the more protective bumpers will appeal precisely to
those consumers whose vehicles are more expensive to repair and whose time is
economically more valuable, thus eliminating cases which skewed the agency's figures
against the 2.5 mph standard ....
[I]t seems that the proper referent for the agency's
analysis should have been not a nation with 2.5 mph bumper cars, but a nation with
the mix of bumpers that a 2.5 mph bumper would produce. The agency's failure even
to attempt such a calculation was perhaps its most obvious inadequacy-and
it was an
52
inadequacy that went entirely to the petitioners' advantage.

Although the discussion of the role of consumer heterogeneity and the
market-matching process of product attributes is quite sound, the overall
conclusion that the neglect of these market features bolsters the petitioners'
arguments misses the more fundamental implications of market processes.
The 5.0 mph bumper will be demanded by some consumers because the
benefits of a 5.0 mph bumper exceed their costs for those with expensive cars
or other characteristics that boost the value of sturdier bumpers. Similarly,
the 2.5 mph bumper will be demanded by those for whom a 5.0 mph bumper
imposes more costs than benefits. Scalia correctly observes that NHTSA's
52.
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abstraction from the resulting heterogeneity biases the analysis against the 2.5
mph standard, which the petitioners oppose. Although oversights in analyses
by government agencies should not be encouraged, in this instance the net
effect of adjusting for the oversight will surely be to the petitioners'
disadvantage. The omission of the consumer heterogeneity issue is typical of
the kinds of simplifications generally made in regulatory analyses.
VI
CONCLUSION

Economics plays a substantial role in the NHTSA bumper regulation
decision, not because the court frames the legal argument in economic terms,
but because the Cost Savings Act is quite specific in its benefit-cost
orientation. The role of economic analysis could perhaps be decreased.
Judge Wright, for example, argues that the provisions of the Safety Act are
more binding than those of the Cost Savings Act. However, no strong basis
exists for subordinating the benefit-cost concerns.
As a result, the court in this case operates in a reactive mode, using the
NHTSA analysis as its underlying framework. Judge Scalia provides a cogent
critique of the NHTSA analysis, makes modifications in the analysis where
needed, and in some instances provides a quite sophisticated economic
analysis of the issues involved.
In this instance there can be little doubt that application of economic
analysis has led to a sounder policy outcome. The issue of whether sturdier
bumpers benefit consumers on balance is addressed quite directly by a
benefit-cost test. The principal feature omitted from this efficiency calculation
is distributional concerns which, to the extent that they are consequential,
support the 2.5 mph bumpers. Why, for example, should low-income
consumers who have inexpensive cars and low values for their time loss due to
accidents (in terms of foregone wages) be required to purchase an expensive
bumper system? Not only do these gains cost more than their accidentreduction benefits for the average consumer, but for the low-income
consumer the gap will be even starker.
A related issue is whether the application of economic analysis has
improved the quality of the legal decision. In this instance, it is difficult to
envision how some reliance on economic analysis could have been avoided.
The legislative provisions and the agency's analysis were in economic terms.
Some economic reasoning was inevitable if the court was to address these
issues sensibly.
A more general issue is whether the use of economic analysis will increase
or decrease the role of the judiciary. Judges clearly cannot impose benefitcost tests on policies when there exists no basis for doing so. Rather, their
task is to assess whether the agency's actions were outside a range of
reasonable behavior. As Judge Scalia observes:
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We do not reverse simply because there are uncertainties, analytic imperfections, or
even mistakes in the pieces of the picture petitioners have chosen to bring to our
attention ... but only when there is such an absence of overall rational support as to
warrant the description "arbitrary and capricious." That description is plainly not
appropriate here .

. .

.

[NHTSA's] conclusions are within the range of those a

reasonable person could
derive from the evidence presented. No more is necessary to
53
survive our review.

On balance, Scalia views the application of benefit-cost analysis as
reducing the likelihood that an agency's views will be overturned by the
court. 54 As noted above, this conclusion is likely to hold to the extent that

benefit-cost analysis provides an internally consistent and comprehensive
accounting system for considering a policy's diverse effects. Requiring that a
policy meet a benefit-cost test, however, provides a well defined reference
point against which rationality is to be judged. This latter feature may
increase the likelihood that a policy will be overturned.
Consider, for example, the situation that would have prevailed if the Cost
Savings Act had imposed no benefit-cost test. The NHTSA administrator
could have required a 5.0 mph standard, citing evidence that these bumpers
are more protective, are not prohibitively expensive, and are consistent with
NHTSA's responsibilities to protect automobile consumers. Alternatively,
NHTSA could have required only a 2.5 mph bumper, citing the higher costs
of more protective bumpers and the absence of any safety benefits. In each
case, a plausible basis would have existed for a particular course of action that
would satisfy a loosely defined rationality criterion.
With a required benefit-cost test, however, a given set of agency actions
are more likely to be found arbitrary and capricious. If an important benefit
or cost component is ignored by the agency, then the regulatory decision can
be overturned. The safety benefits of a sturdier bumper would have been one
such component if there were any evidence that the safety effects were
consequential. Similarly, gross misassessment of a benefit or cost component
would cast doubt on the agency's action.
As a result, there is no reason to believe that the increased application of
economic reasoning will necessarily reduce the burden on the courts. The
use of the benefit-cost approach will tend to rationalize the policymaking
process, but the requirement of a benefit-cost test imposes a more stringent
standard of rationality. While increased use of economics will not necessarily
reduce the burden on the courts, it should enhance the quality of judicial
decisionmaking.
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